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-2-pro~ramming solution for a renewable resource market, but restríct their analysis to a de[er:ninistic discrete-time (two-period) framework with zero extraction costs.
The main goals of this paper are to analyze a stochastic modal of renewable resource markets, which gives rise to a unique symmetric vash equilibrium solution, and to compare open-loop and sub-game perfect Nash equílibrium solutions. A similar stochastic analysis can be found in Clemhout and Wan (1985b) , but they focus on multi-resource models and provide erplicit solutions to different examples.
The objective of this paper is to consider the implications of dynamic information patterns for oligopolistic resource markets with restricted entry and exit and, more specifically, to com~are open-loop and feedback or credible oligopolies with efficient outcomes. Section 2 sets up a continuoustime problem of oligopolistic resource depletion and allows for renewable, as well as exhaustible, resources and extraction costs that decline with the stock of untapped reserves. Section 3 compares the oligopoly with static information patterns with the efficient and cartel outcomes and shows that oliqopolies with more dynamic information patterns have an infinite number of Nash equilibria. Section 4 argues that, when there are serially uncorrelated shocks to the natural replenishment rate, the sub-game perfect Nash or credible equilibrium ís not dominated by any of the other Nash equilíbria.
The resultinq stochastic credible arbitraqe equation i s compared with the
open-loop arbitraqe equation and with the efficient and cartel outcomes.
Section 4 also shows that, when there are isolated markets, demand is isoelastic and extraction costs are zero, the sub-game perfect Nash equilíbrium solution is inefficient. Section 5 considers an example that perm;ts an explicit analytical solution and Section 6 considers~ol~cie~to correct for 7 the~tock externalities.
Sec~ion 7 cozcludes the~aper with some observations on the problem of time-inconsístency.
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2.
A common resource problem with restricted entry and exit Let x, ui , N and Y denote the untapped stock of common resource, the harvestinq rate of firm i, the total number of firms in the industry N and the industry harvest (Y~E ui), respectively. The dynamics of resource ial depletion follow a stochastic pattern (e.g., Pinàyck, 1984) and are qiven by dX a{H (X) -Y}dt f v(X) dw, (2 .1)
where dw a E(t)~, E(t) ti IN(O, 1) and w(t) is Brownian motion. In the absence of depletion or shocks, the stock level x is c the natural carrying capacity of the common and is a stable equilibrium.
The stock level xb -0 is called the biotic potential, which in the absence of depletion is unstable and therefore there is no danger of extínction in the absence of depletion. The pool as modelled is truly common to all firms, so that there are no esplicit private property rights.l 1 Alternatively, there are private property rights and seepage occurs at an infinite speed. The more qeneral case of prívate pools with sluqqish seepaqe will not be discussed here (Sinn, 1984; Eswaran and Lewis, 1984 ).
-4-we assume that all fizms harvestinq the common face identical costs.
The effort (e.g., vessels, fish nets or man-power), ci, required to achieve 
If the common resource can be freely traded in the industry, the instantaneous profit function of each firm may be written as
Observe that the profit function allows for both stock and flow externalities.l Each firm maximizes the expected value of its discounted stream of profits, IIí -o~ni(x, ul, ... uN 1 Since a(O)~O, stochastic fluctuations disappear after date T aad the resource cannot be reqenerat4d. Clemhout and Wan (1985a) discuss, for a deterministíc model, whether extinction occurs asymptotically or in finite time.
-6-We are also interested i n socially optimal policies, which pertain when the government coordinates the actíons of the firms and consumers in order to maximize the sum of profits and consumers' surplus and ignores issues of income distribution.
Instead of ( 2.3), one maximizes the expected value of the social benefit function, 
c.s.
(3.4) must hold. Hence, the shadow rent of a unit of the resource is, in equilibrium, equal to the amortized value of future reductions in cost arising from holding an extra unit where the market interest rate net of the marginal change in the natural growth rate is used as the net discount rate.
Under a cartel the firms act in a collusive manner to maximize joint profits, so that (3.1) is replaced by
1 The possibility of extinction increases when prices are low and demand is high.
-8-where n r-PI(P'y)~O i s the elasticity of market demand. The difference is that the price of the harvest i s replaced by its marginal revenue, which typically means that a cartel under-extracts and allows the resource to replenish i tself to a higher level, thus forcing down the shadow value of untapped reserves.l The reason ís that in order to extract the consumers' surplus the sales of the resource must reduce, which typically leads to larqer reserves.
Oliqopoly outcomes with static i nformation patterns
Perhaps the most frequently used solution concept for equilibrium of a dynamic oligopoly with restricted entry and exit is the open-loop Nash equilibrium (e.q., Ba~sar and Olsder, 1982, Section 6.5.1). For example, it has been used by Dasqupta and Iieal (1979, Chapter 11), Salant (1976) , Khalatbari (1977) and Bolle (1980) in their studies of oliqopolistic resource markets.
Each firm is assumed to take the harvests of rival firms (and the total number of firms in the industry) as given and to condition its strategy on the information available at the start of the planning period, x(O), that ís the ínformation of firm i at time t is given by IC -{x(0)}. This solutíon concept relies upon statíc information patterns, since fírms are assumed to not update their information sets even though there might be an índividual incentíve to use incoming data on the stock of reserves.
Proposition 1: Under Assumpticns 1 and 2(a), the necessary condítions for a symmetric OLNES with a(x) -0 are: (2.1), 
imposing symmetry, one obtains (3.6)-(3.7).
The steady-state zent to the industry, Vr a N~i, satisfiesl
whilst xt~xc and H(x~) a Y} must also hold in equilibrium. T'he marginal revenue of the harvest of each firm matches the marginal cost of its extraction plus the rent of untapped reserves, where the latter item equals the capitalized value (usinq the net rate of discount, r-H'(x')) of the reduction in future operatinq costs for each firm due to a marginal increase in the current harvest. 
1
In fact, for this case a cartel also extracts efficiently. However, if each firm owns a part of the pool and seepage~s sluggish, the outcome results in too rapid extraction.
This inefficiency arises from an unclear definition of private property rights (IQialatbari, 1977) . The conventional open-loop Nash equilibrium is only one of many Nash equilibria and is not necessarily the most sensible solution concept under all circumstances. Due to its passive information structure, the differential 1 game consists of one sub-qame only and is really a static game.
Much more qeneral is the class of closed-looo, no-memory Nash equilibria (e.g., Basar
and Olsder, 1982, Section 6.5.2), which postulates for each firm a conjecture or reaction hypothesis about the harvest strateqies of its rivals of the follawinq form uj(t)~e j(t, x(o), x(t)),~-1, ...~t.
The memory-less information structure is more realistic, because firms are assumed to have access to the current, as well as the initial, stock of reserves.
Proposition 2: L'nder Assumptíons 1 and 2(a) and the policy rules (3.9), the necessary conditions for a symmetric~ILNES are: (2.1), (3.6) and
The procedure ís as in Proposition 1, but now one must take into account the effects of the current stock, x(t), upon the actions of the rival firms and consequently upon the Hamiltonian of firm i:
r~i -~i -óhl~ax(t) t E(ahl~áu.)(a8.~ax(t)) where hl is J~i J J defíned as before. The above arbitrage equation yields (3.10). a 1 For infinite discrete-time differential qames,~one could convert the dynamic game to a static game by stacking the policy instruments for all periods of the planning horizon (e.g., Kydland, 1975 ). Using (3.6) and assuming a non-zero harvest, it follows from (3.10)
that the steady-state rent to the industry is qiven by Reinganum and Stokey (1985) use a deterministic olígopoly model for exhaustíble resources with íso-elastic demand and zero extractíon costs to examine the choíce of strategy space. The OL:VES corresponds to path strategies with commitment over the entire length of the planning period and the SPNES corresponds to decision rule strategies with no commicment at all. Intermediate cases depend on the length of the period over which firms can make 1 Buth the OL~;ES and the SP~;ES (and FBNES) were~rigína'ly discussed ín Starr and Ho (1969a, b) . The SPtiES to the problem cf oligopolistic, renewable resource markets is di~cussed for tne general stochastic case in Sectíon 4.2.
-15-commitment, which can vary from zero to T. Reinganum and Stokey (1985) find that shortening the períod of commitment leads to more rapid depletion rates, which fits in with the above analysis. Pareto-suoerior to both the OLVES and the SPNES.2 Similarly, within the context of oliqopolistic resource depletion, firms will find it (even in deterministic environments) optimal to condition their harvest on the expected qrowth in the stock level as well as on current and initial stock levels.3 For example, 1 These are related to the "folk" theorems obtained in the literature on repeated games (e.q., Fudenberg and Maskin, 1983) . The extension of differential game theory to stochastic observations poses tremendous problems (some of these are discussed for the linear-quadratic, zero-sum case by Bagchi and Olsder, 1981) .
u j (t) -? . (t, x ( O) , x(t) , xe (t) ) , an d t . xe(t) -~j x(i)exp{ -~(t -T)}dt,~? O
-m 1 where xe(t) is a weighted averaqe of past stock growth rates. However, it will be arqued in Section 4.2 that, when the resource dynamics are stochastic and the shocks are serially uncorrelated, the SPtiES is as good as any~~ther CL~ES with memorv strategies and the problem of informational non-uniqueness is then resolved (cf. Basar and Ho, 1974; Basar, 1979; Basar and Olsder, 1982 , Section 6.4). For the case of a social planner who maximizes (2.4) subject to (2.1), the stochastic version of the Jacobi-Hamilton-Bellman equation of dynamic programming ( e.g., Davis, 1977, Section 6.1; Chow, 1979 ) is given by 1 Brito (1972) analyzes this special type of inemozy strateqy for two countries in Nash equilibrium decidinq whether to consu~e or invest in arms and finds that a more sophisticated information pattern of the form (3.9') and (3.12) destabilizes the arms race.
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rV -Vt -~Sa2 ( x) Vxx t Max {s (Y) -c (x) Y t Vx (H (x) -Y) } Y
where the value function, V(t, x), is the optimal discounted stream of expected social benefits from time t onwards. It follows that
holds, so that the harvest declines when the marginal cost of extraction or the shadow price of the untapped resource inczeases. The Markovian nature of (2.1) ensures that the catch strategies need only be conditioned on the current and not on past stock levels. Upon differentiation of (4.1) with respect to x and application of Ito's differential rule, one obtains the efficient arbitrage rule (Pindyck, 1984) 1~d shocks to resource growth beíng serially uncorrelated and implies a unique symmetric NES for the stochastic game. As Q(x)~0, the SPNES corresponds to a robust NES of the deterministíc game as it is insensitive to zero-mean, serially uncorrelated random shocks to resource growth.
In the long-run firms enter and exit the industry until all unexploited profit opportunities are wiped out (p -c). The bias due to the ability of firms to take account of dynamic information patterns then disappears and the open-loop extraction plans with static information patterns will also be credible.
In the short-run firms are able to make oligopoly profits (or lesses), so that use of information on past and current stock levels in the formulation of extraction plans introduces an upward (downward) bias of the market rate of interest over and above the risk-premium. This follows from the concavity of the value functions, so that at the optimum
-20-ar.d th e information bias on the riqht-hand-side of (4.6) is positive ( unless firms make losses). Hence, as closed-loop, memorl or feedback information patterns take account of the fact that the depletion of an additional unit of the resource leads rivals to harvest less, the extraction occurs on average at a faster rate than with static information patterns and the stock of untapped resource is deplet2d to a Lower level.
Isolated markets
Corollary 1 shows that when there are no stock externalíties (and demand is iso-elastíc) the OLNES is efficient. These conditions are, however, not sufficient for the effficiency of the SPNES. This Section shows that when there are no flow externalities either, which occurs when there are isolated which yields Y-Np-1(Vx) and therefore EtdYlYdt --n~tdVxlVxdt.
Upon differentiation with respect to x and applícation of Ito's rule, the efficient arbitrage equation reduces to (4.10). Hence, the SPNES is effícient. LJ
For the general case of isolated markets with stock-dependent extraction costs and not necessarily iso-elastíc demand, the CLVES, MLNES, FBNES and SPNES coincide with the OLNES.
Example: Zero extraction costs and iso-elastic demand
We consider the special case of zero extraction costs and iso-elastic demand, Y~bP-n, because then the open-loop oliqopoly is efficientl and serves as a useful benchmark for comparison with an oligopoly with more dynamic information patterns. We also assume a logistic growth curve,
where q is the intrinsic qrowth rate and a(x) -ax, so that the variance -22-of the shocks increases~rith the size of untapped reserves.
In that case, Pindyck (1984) shows that, for r1 -~, the efficient outcome yields
as the solution to (4.1), VX -~1~x2~yxx -
for r~g x(m) has a qamma distribution with shape parameter aE z(q -r)~Q2
and scale parameter BE s(Q2xc~2g),
for r~g, and x IEEY(m) -4(1 -g)(r t g-a2), for r~q.
(5.4)
Stochastic variations in the natural replenishment rate (or reductions in the rate of impatience or the intrinsic growth rate) reduce the social value of the resource (due to V~O), increase the shadow price of reserves and xx consequently reduce the harvest rate.l The reduction in the harvest rate, due to stochastic fluctuations is just sufficient to leave the expected stock unchanged.
If the discount rate exceeds the intrinsic growth rate, extinction of the resource occurs with probability 1.
The value function for the industry under a feedback oligopoly, say tIF(t, x), follows from (4.7) and must satisfy 1 When n is increased or H(x) is more skewed to the left ( as with thẽ ompertz growth curve), it is possible that sbochastic fluctuations increase rent and the harvest rate ( Pindyck, 1984) .
the harvest rate is givenl -23-
For n-~and N~3, it can be shown that
is a solution of (5.6 ), so that the rent is given by X 3~i~x2 and the harvest rate follaws from (4.5),
Y-A(t, x)~AFx, AF z (r t q-02) (N -2)~(N -3) .
It is clear that the SPNES for an olígopoly with dynamic information Hence, i n qeneral, a high elasticity of demand implies more excessive extraction rates.
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(g -AF) -Q2
Hence, the excessive extraction rates that occur with an oligopoly with dynamic information patterns lead to a lower expected value (and variance) of the steady-state stock of untapped reserves. The expected steady-state harvest increases due to a higher extraction rate and decreases due to the lower steady-state stock.
The distribution of the steady-state stock is also more skewed for the credible oligopoly than for the efficient outcome. If thís is the case and the discount rate exceeds the intrinsíc growth rate, it is actually possible to have extinction in the efficient outcome even though this does not occur with probability 1 for a credible oligopoly.
Economic policy
It has been established that credíble extraction strategies are inefficient even when demand is iso-elastic and extraction costs are zero.
One way to correct for these externalities is to employ Pigouvian taxes. An alternative way to ensure effícient harvesting is to use the legal system to introduce private property rights, but this will be difficult with seepage of the resource across the common. Yet another way to obtain effíciency is to encourage free entry and exít until all profits and consequently the information bias and associated inefficiencies (cf. (6.2)) are elíminated, but this may be politically infeasible when there is a forceful lobby of existing firms.
Concluding remarks
The conditioning of harvest strategies on the ínital stock of reserves gíves, even in deterministic environments, very misleading results for the t behaviour of an oligopoly, although not for a cartel, competitive industry or a social planner.
For example, with zero extraction costs and iso-elastic demand, an oligopoly with static information patterns ís effícient. However, if firms are allowed to have access to past and current stock levels, inefficiencies occur and more rapid extraction rates (or even extínction) are possible. This follows from each firm taking account of the fact that, if it harvests an extra unit at any time in the future, the increased cost of extractíon and rent of the resource will induce its rivals to harvest somewhat less and therefore the price it can fetch for its harvest and its marginal cost of extraction will not fall as much. This illustrates that an increase in information can be detrimental to firms in the industry, although, typically, it would benefit a cartel or social planner. In general it pays each firm to condítion its harvest on past, as well as current, stock levels, but if the stochastic shocks to the natural replenishment rate are serially uncorrelated pure feedback strategies suffice. Although the feedback and open-loop Nash equilibrium solutions give very different outcomes for an oligopoly extracting from a common pool, it can be easíly shown that for separate pools with no seepage or for isolated markets the two equilibria coincide. It is clear that, apart from this special case, extraction strategies should be based upon realistic information sets.
It ís important to stress that the inefficiencies resulting from dynamic information patterns are quite independent of the problem of timeinconsistency, because there is no incentíve in either the open-loop or the c]osed-loop Nash equilibrium for any firm to renege on announced strategies.
The principle of sub-game perfectness is therefore not necessary for ruling out time-inconsistency. However, when there is unequal market power due to the presence of a dominant firm, the feedback strategies do rule out equílibria that are based on expectations of the actíons of the market leader that would s not be rational to carry out if called upon to do so.
For example, in a model -28-of one dominant producer (OPEC) and a competitive fringe of oil producers, bindín~commitments on pricing strategíes are required to avoíd the problem of time-inconsistency in the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. Also, the market leader is typically worse off in the feedback Stackelberg than in the open-loop Stackelberg (or even feedback~ash) equilibrium, due to his inability to convince the fringe that he is renouncing his market power (Kaskin and Newbery, 1978; Newbery, 1981; Karp, 1984) . These types of credíbility problems did not occur in the present paper, because all firms were assumed to have equal market power. Hence, any A.
(.) has to be a feedback strategy independent of all iT-1 past strategies and past values of the s~ate (uíT-1 -eiT-1(xT-1))'
